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Abstract—Many modern cities strive to integrate information
technology into every aspect of city life to create so-called smart
cities. Smart cities rely on a large number of application areas
and technologies to realize complex interactions between citizens,
third parties, and city departments. This overwhelming com-
plexity is one reason why holistic privacy protection only rarely
enters the picture. A lack of privacy can result in discrimination
and social sorting, creating a fundamentally unequal society. To
prevent this, we believe that a better understanding of smart
cities and their privacy implications is needed. We therefore
systematize the application areas, enabling technologies, privacy
types, attackers and data sources for the attacks, giving structure
to the fuzzy term “smart city”. Based on our taxonomies, we
describe existing privacy-enhancing technologies, review the state
of the art in real cities around the world, and discuss promising
future research directions. Our survey can serve as a reference
guide, contributing to the development of privacy-friendly smart
cities.
Index Terms—Smart City, Taxonomy, Privacy, Types of Pri-
vacy, Status Quo, Privacy-enhancing Technologies (PETS)
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart City has become an umbrella term for numerous
technologies with the goal of improving the efficiency of future
cities and the quality of life for their inhabitants, not just
by introducing new applications but also by making existing
processes smarter. It has become fashionable to call cities
smart and there are political efforts intended to encourage the
development of smart cities [1]. There exist a number of formal
definitions of what makes a city smart: Caragliu et al. define “a
city to be smart when investments in human and social capital
and traditional (transport) and modern (ICT) communication
infrastructure fuel sustainable economic growth and a high
quality of life, with a wise management of natural resources,
through participatory governance.” [2]. While others argue
that there cannot be an absolute definition as the term smart
city does not describe a static concept but rather a process
towards more liveable and resilient cities [3], there seems to
be agreement that certain novel technologies and applications
amount to making cities smarter [4].
The number of smart city applications is large, ranging from
smart card services for easy authentication and payment on
the go, to smart resource management of water or electricity,
to smart mobility applications that improve traffic efficiency
and reduce CO2 emissions. The effectiveness of these and
other smart city applications heavily relies on data collection,
interconnectivity, and pervasiveness.
Unfortunately, this is also the reason why smart cities pose
a major threat to the privacy of citizens: The collection and
correlation of large amounts of data allows the creation of
detailed profiles encompassing every aspect of life. For example,
a smart card service may disclose purchase behaviors, a smart
building may reveal which appliances are used, and a smart
mobility application may leak location traces of its users. In
addition, the overcollection of sensitive user data constitutes
a business case [5] and is already a problem in smartphone
applications [6].
The high level of interconnectivity further adds to the body
of privacy problems. Combining multiple data sources from
different data holders, devices, and applications can improve
service quality and availability, but also increases the risk
for leaks of sensitive data and privacy violations through
correlation.
The pervasiveness of applications and sensors leaves the
individual citizen no choice but to become a digital part of
future cities. Contrary to social networks where users willingly
disclose personal information, many smart city applications
do not require or even allow the user to control what data is
being collected or transmitted. This loss of data sovereignty
is a concerning development because opting out of the smart
city is infeasible for many.
To make things worse, privacy protection does not yet seem
to be an integral part in current smart city development. Several
rankings compare cities in terms of smartness [7], [8], [9] by
assigning scores to dozens of indicators. Across the three
rankings, only one indicator refers to privacy, particularly the
presence of a privacy policy. Academic literature on privacy in
smart cities is still scarce, and many reports intended for the
creators of smart cities do not even mention the word privacy.
For example, a case study on world-leading smart cities does
not cover privacy [10], and even though a recent report on
smart cities in the UK mentions privacy in passing, it does
not acknowledge it as a general challenge or problem [11].
Readers of these reports – which are targeted at city leaders,
vendors, service providers, and investors – could be led to
believe that there are no privacy concerns in smart cities at all.
On the bright side, many studies have identified that user
acceptance is one of the most important requirements for
the successful introduction and operation of new smart city
technologies [12]. The fact that user acceptance is strongly
dependent on the level of privacy protection [13], [14] requires
cities, corporations, and researchers to design privacy-protecting
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a key role in the success of new services or products.
The implementation of privacy protection is complicated by
the complexity of the smart city landscape, in particular the
diversity of applications, technologies, involved parties, privacy
threats and existing protection mechanisms. Understanding
these aspects and their interconnection is necessary so that
engineers, stakeholders, and researchers can design a privacy-
friendly smart city and avoid contributing to an Orwellian
future.
Contributions. In this article, we systematize the over-
whelming complexity of the smart city with a particular focus
on privacy. Our main contributions are:
• We present taxonomies for (1) the applications a smart
city may provide, (2) the technologies used to enable them,
(3) the types of privacy affected by smart city applications,
(4) the attackers, and (5) the sources of data attackers can
use.
• We present an overview of building blocks for privacy
protections, including strategies to incorporate privacy
into system design, cryptographic techniques to protect
sensitive data, and security considerations.
• For each enabling technology, we identify privacy threats
and describe possible solutions. Where applicable we point
to open research directions.
• We review examples of smart city applications that have
already been realized in cities around the world and
analyze which privacy protections have been deployed.
• We discuss research directions that could contribute to
privacy protection in smart cities.
II. TAXONOMIES
In this section we present the taxonomies used throughout
this article. First, we classify smart city applications and the
technologies that enable them. These taxonomies are based on
an extensive review of literature and the state of the art in the
domain of smart cities. While the differentiation of various
smart city applications seems to be a common approach, taking
a closer look into the technologies that enable these applications
can provide more clarity on where and how privacy is at risk.
This allows the classification and structuring of current smart
city research and development, however, we note that these
taxonomies may need to be extended in the future when new
application areas arise and new technologies become available.
We then present a taxonomy of privacy, dividing it into five
types that show which kind of user information is exposed.
Finally, we classify types of attackers in the smart city and
the data sources through which they can compromise user
privacy. Table I shows which attackers, data sources, and
privacy types have already been shown to be applicable to each
of the enabling technologies and points to relevant examples
in the literature.
A. Smart City Applications
The overarching goals of smart cities are to improve
their citizens’ quality of life and to create economic growth.
These two goals can be achieved by increasing efficiency
Fig. 1. Smart city applications and enabling technologies.
and sustainability, by allowing citizens to participate, and by
improving decision making through the increased availability
of information. To this end, many smart city applications have
been proposed or already been deployed in nine key areas:
Mobility, Utilities, Buildings, Environment, Public Services,
Governance, Economy, Health Care, and Citizens (see top half
of Figure 1).
These nine areas are by no means isolated from each other.
Rather, services in different areas can interact and are often
deployed in conjunction. For example, smart buildings are often
combined with smart utility solutions to enable grid-controlled
electricity demand management [12], [15].
Smart Mobility. One of the features most associated with
the smart city is a smart transportation system that improves
traffic safety and efficiency, reduces the time citizens spend in
transit and thus improves quality of life. The applications in
this area cover both private and public transport: Intelligent
vehicles are envisioned to introduce advanced driver assistance
systems or even autonomous driving by the use of sophisticated
sensors [16] and communication systems [17]. Smart, adaptive
traffic lights can improve traffic flow and reduce travel times and
CO2 emissions [18]. Location-based services such as assistance
systems for finding the nearest gas station [19], EV charging
station [20], or free parking spots [21] (combined with dynamic
pricing [22]) can reduce delays and improve traffic flows in
the city. On a larger scale, traffic flow optimization during
rush hours and public events [22] and bus route optimization
[23] further contribute to increasing traffic efficiency. Finally,
shared bike programs [10] and a network of cycling paths [22]
can reduce car traffic and air pollution.
Smart Utilities. Smart utilities aim to reduce the con-
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can thus contribute to economic growth, sustainability, and
efficiency. Well-known examples for smart utility applications
are smart grids, virtual power plants [12], and distributed
energy storage [24]. These systems are usually enabled by
installing smart metering devices [23] but can also incor-
porate decentralized electricity generation or even electric
vehicles [25]. Other smart utilities include water monitoring and
water pressure management [21], or the adaptive employment
of both conventional and renewable power plants based on the
current and projected electricity demand [24].
Smart Buildings. Smart buildings aim to make residential
and commercial buildings both more energy-efficient and more
convenient to live or work in. For example, smart buildings can
monitor their own structural health [21], regulate lighting and
heating based on presence detection [26], and use intelligent
appliances to automate everyday tasks [27], [15]. The field of
home automation, also known as the smart home [28], has
experienced a noticeable increase in popularity lately. A number
of connected sensor and actuators work together to improve the
home’s energy efficiency and introduce new comfort features.
Smart Environment. Smart environments aim to improve
the sustainability of cities and the quality and safety of citizens’
lives, e.g., by the creation of noise and air pollution maps
[21], [22], [26]. This enables the timely detection of unhealthy
or hazardous conditions and allows the authorities to react
accordingly, for example, by limiting traffic in an affected
area, warning citizens, or even evacuating entire areas of the
city [29]. Further, sensor networks can detect natural disasters
such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, floods, and
forest fires [21], [30]. Early warning systems can significantly
contribute to limiting casualties and reducing property damage.
Ideally, these systems work together with other aspects of the
smart city such as smart transportation to control traffic flows
out of the city or smart utilities to shut down power plants in
the hazard zone.
Smart Public Services. The goal of smart public services
is to deploy public resources efficiently and effectively. Appli-
cations include adaptive waste management, for example by
optimizing routes for waste collection [22] or the installation of
smart trash cans that send alerts when full [23]. Crisis response
and management applications can make resources and data
such as building plans available to first responders [31]. The
timeliness and effectiveness of public safety services can be
supported by distributed sensing systems such as connected
cameras [27] or audio monitoring systems [13]. Other examples
include smart street lighting that adapts to movement of cyclists
and pedestrians to increase traffic safety and improve energy
efficiency [32].
Smart Governance. Smart governance tries to increase
transparency, improve the efficiency of local government, and
tailor government services to its citizens. For example, open
data enables citizens, third-party developers, and the city
council to access and cross-reference different data sources
[20], which can increase both transparency and efficiency.
E-government services allow citizens to complete most interac-
tions with government services online, e.g., when booking
weddings or applying for social housing, resident parking
permits, or schools [10], [33]. Citizen participation allows
individuals to get involved in city planning and development
processes, for example through apps to report problems, virtual
community meetings [10], and online portals for citizens to
propose improvements to their city [20].
Smart Economy. A smart economy aims to create economic
growth, for example through public-private partnerships [22]
and new business models such as recommender services
[34]. New business models are also based on the increasing
availability of open data [10] and the drive to integrate
data from different sources [12]. Cities can encourage en-
trepreneurship by supporting office spaces for startups, creating
collaborative spaces and entrepreneur networks [20], and by
offering affordable broadband connectivity [10].
Smart Health Care. Smart health includes the efficient and
effective provision of health care. For example, smart medical
centers can combine patient health records from multiple
sources and thus improve medical care [23]. Smart health care
can also rely on data from connected medical devices [32] and
wearables [35]. Citizens can receive treatment via tele-health
to reduce waiting and travel times [6]. Lastly, smart health care
aims to empower patients by granting them access to their own
health records and information about their conditions [10].
Smart Citizens. Finally, smart cities aim to invest in
people to create smart citizens [32] and smart communities
[34]. For example, smart education uses life-long learning
programs [22], which may focus on employability [11], digital
inclusion [10], or specific population groups, e.g., children with
autism [36]. Subsidized broadband connectivity can support
citizens in disadvantaged neighborhoods [10], and interactive
information poles can give citizens and tourists access to various
services [23].
B. Enabling Technologies
The novelty and innovation in the smart city does not
primarily lie in the applications but in the use of underlying
technologies that enable them. Based on our literature review,
we grouped technologies commonly associated with the smart
city into nine categories: Ubiquitous Connectivity, Smart Cards,
(Participatory) Sensor Networks, Wearable Devices, the Internet
of Things (IoT), Intelligent Vehicles, Autonomous Systems,
Cloud Computing, and Open Data (see bottom half of Figure 1).
These technologies in turn were made possible by other
technological progress. To name a few, embedded systems have
significantly expedited pervasive and ubiquitous computing.
Smaller and faster microprocessors allow complex tasks to be
computed by portable devices or even home appliances. Energy-
efficient computing as well as long-lasting batteries extend the
lifetime of mobile devices and exterior sensors. Lastly, radio
technology such as passive RFID tags and microstrip antennas
have made it possible to equip even the smallest items with
communication capabilities, making them a potential part of
the interconnected smart city.
Most smart city applications rely on a combination of
two or more of these enabling technologies. For example,
a combination of participatory sensor networks and ubiquitous
connectivity enables city-wide real-time monitoring of noise
and air pollution which contributes to a smarter environment.
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requirement for many services that incorporate user devices
such as smartphones, tablet computers, smart appliances, or
intelligent vehicles. In urban areas, most homes are already
equipped with landline broadband Internet and the coverage of
high speed cellular networks such as 4G is swiftly increasing.
With small enough cells and new technologies such as 5G,
mobile Internet should be able to fully support emerging smart
city applications [37].
There are, however, reasons for users to choose a WiFi-based
Internet connection over a cellular link. Often, cellular Internet
plans come with a limit in data volume, therefore transferring
large media files is not an option. Other users, such as tourists
from other countries, might not have a cellular Internet plan
and fully rely on other possibilities to connect to the Internet.
In these cases, projects to offer free Internet connections using
public WiFi, possibly provided by the city, shops, or even
private user groups, can offer a viable alternative to cellular
Internet access.
Smart Cards. Modern smart cards enable the transmission
of authentication data, function as cashless payment methods,
or even serve as driver’s license and travel documents [38].
While smart cards have been around for decades, contact-less
smart cards and the interconnection of smart card readers
enables many new applications. Most current smart cards are
based on the ISO/IEC 14443 family of standards [39]. They
have writable storage, a microprocessor, and use a transmission
technology similar to RFID for short range communication.
Many smart card applications can operate offline, requiring
the smart card to hold all of the necessary data which is then
accessed by a smart card reader/writer. The smart card readers
can also be connected to a back-end server to allow additional
security and accounting features.
Open Data. Open data refers to data that is publicly available
(technical openness) and may be used and analyzed by third
parties (legal openness). Open data can increase government
transparency and foster innovation by allowing third parties to
offer services based on city data. Cities can use open source
platforms like CKAN to release data [22].
(Participatory) Sensor Networks. Sensor networks are the
basis for many applications in the smart city, ranging from
smart public services to smart buildings and environments,
to smart mobility. They can be seen as knowledge collectors
providing the data necessary for (possibly automated) informed
decisions and actions. Examples include fire detection or air
pollution monitoring, but also CCTV systems and induction
loops (when connected to a central traffic control center). Cities
aim to increase sensor coverage and availability to monitor
every aspect of the city. Sensor networks in smart cities can
also include the sensing capabilities of citizens’ devices such as
smartphones. This is referred to as participatory sensing, crowd
sensing, or opportunistic sensing [14], [40]. Location-based
services are another application enabled by sensors, particularly
the availability of small receivers for satellite-based positioning
systems like GPS, GLONASS, and GALILEO.
Wearable Devices. In contrast to data generated by sensor
networks, the data from wearable devices or body area networks
is almost always personal data specific to the wearer. The
devices monitor different aspects of the body, e.g., blood
pressure, heart rate, or even brain activity [41]. Equipped
with communication technology, these readings can then be
transmitted to medical practitioners, contributing to smarter
health care. Wearable devices may not only be used in a
hospital environment with extensive body monitoring, but
also in other areas such as private homes, e.g., to monitor
vital signs of patients with chronic illness. The American
Federal Communications Commission has already allocated a
dedicated spectrum for both use cases [42]. At the same time,
wearable devices for recreational use, such as smart watches
and fitness wristbands, are rapidly gaining popularity. Other
types of wearable devices include smart glasses and contact
lenses [43] that can augment reality to interact with smart
city applications and technology. Smart nanotextiles, featuring
sensing, actuation, and communication capabilities, will further
contribute to the pervasiveness of health and environmental
monitoring [44]. A person’s wearable devices can be connected
to form a so-called body area network to provide additional
features such as data aggregation and fusion as well as the
possibility for low-energy devices to interact with the smart
city though a gateway node, e.g., the wearer’s mobile phone.
Wearable devices could also be incorporated to access smart
city services, e.g., by conveniently displaying information or
by using the device to interact with readers. They could further
be envisioned to serve as sensors and be integrated as a part
of a greater (participatory) sensor network.
Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT is “a global infrastructure
for the information society, enabling advanced services by
interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing
and evolving interoperable information and communication
technologies” [45]. The IoT thus describes the equipping of
common objects with communication devices (often connecting
to big data services), sensors, and actuators [46]. While
conceptually similar to sensor networks, the difference in the
IoT is that the sensing and communication capabilities are not
the main feature of the object, but an extension to improve
operation or provide additional services. Popular examples
include smart meters [47], the smart fridge [48], and smart air
conditioning systems [49].
Autonomous Systems. Autonomous systems, often in the
form of robots, will play an important role in future cities. For
example, autonomous vehicles have the ability to dramatically
change the way people travel by shifting from car ownership
to shared autonomous vehicles [50]. Autonomous systems can
also carry out tasks for the city, such as delivery of goods,
street cleaning or waste collection, and can even extend to
surveillance using autonomous drones [51].
Intelligent Vehicles. Intelligent vehicles are vehicles
equipped with a range of sensors, communication capability,
or the ability to drive autonomously. They can exchange
information in an ad-hoc fashion, inform infrastructure nodes
such as traffic lights and dynamic traffic signs, or access
centralized services like traffic information or emergency
services using cellular technology. The ad-hoc communication
based on IEEE 802.11p has already been standardized in
North America and Europe [52]. Furthermore, the introduction
of autonomous taxis and ride sharing systems can have a
5significant impact on city mobility [53]. Because the average
vehicle is parked 23 hours a day [54], these systems offer a
large potential to reduce the overall number of vehicles.
Cloud Computing. Cloud computing refers to the outsourc-
ing of computational tasks to third parties, which provide either
the hardware infrastructure, the operating system platform, or
entire software applications as a service [55]. Cloud computing
turns the one-time cost of purchasing IT hardware into a
running cost that depends on service consumption. Cloud
services can scale quickly and efficiently to the level of user
demand that a cloud customer experiences. In a smart city, this
is useful to ensure availability of public-facing web services
or to scale the amount of data analysis done on data gathered
throughout the city.
C. Five Types of Privacy
Almost every aspect of a citizen’s privacy is potentially at
stake in a smart city because smart city applications pervade the
very space in which citizens live. Privacy has been established
as a human right in Europe and is often referred to as “the right
to be let alone” [56]. This rather generic definition, however,
is hard to adapt to today’s technology where large amounts of
private data are collected, processed, and stored. This makes
defining privacy difficult. Solove even stated that “privacy a
concept in disarray” and that “nobody can articulate what it
means” [57]. Without a clear definition of privacy violations, it
becomes impossible to safeguard privacy and develop privacy
protection mechanisms. The definition by Nissenbaum [58]
produces relief by defining privacy as contextual integrity.
This concept has found wide adaptation and can serve as a
general guideline when dealing with sensitive data. Following
contextual integrity, the expectations regarding data collection
and dissemination are determined by the social norms in a
particular context. For example, in the context of a doctor’s
visit, one expects that only relevant medical data is collected,
and that the data is not shared outside of the doctor’s practice.
Any use or collection of data outside of these expectations
constitutes a privacy violation.
To better understand the privacy at risk in a specific scenario,
different authors have introduced taxonomies for privacy [57],
[59], [60], [61]. For example, Clarke introduced four types of
privacy in 1997 [59], that is, privacy of the person, personal
data, personal behavior and personal communication. Finn et al.
[61] argue that the advance in technology demands that these
categories be extended and divide privacy into seven types,
namely privacy of person, thoughts, behavior, communication,
association, data and image, and location.
However, we argue that these categories are not defined
clearly enough and make some unnecessary distinctions. We
therefore propose three changes to the categories defined
by Finn et al. First, communication with another person
always includes some form of association, meaning that the
communication and association category can almost not be
separated. Therefore we merge them into the privacy of social
life category. In fact, we believe that communication should not
be a separate privacy category, as it is more of a medium, that,
when compromised, can be exploited to learn every aspect about
Location
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Fig. 2. We define 5 types of privacy to classify privacy risks introduced by
different smart city applications and technologies.
a person. Technologies that can compromise communication
should therefore not be limited to only this one category as
this would be an underestimation of their privacy implications.
Second, the privacy of data and image category is both too
general and too specific at the same time. Personal data can
include information about every other privacy category, and
without sensitive data, there can be no privacy violation. We
therefore remove this aspect and change this category to privacy
of media to not only include images, but also other types of
media, such as audio or video.
Lastly, Finn et al. split Clarke’s category of privacy of the
person into privacy of the person and privacy of thoughts
and feelings. They state that emerging technologies have the
potential to learn about a persons thoughts and feelings and that
these categories should be distinguished “the same way that
the mind can be distinguished from the body” [61]. However,
research in neuroscience and neurophilosophy increasingly
concludes that mind and body are indeed not separate [62].
Both privacy of a person and privacy of thoughts cover aspects
specific to an individual. These are characteristics that are
not necessarily associated with being in a certain location or
with carrying out certain actions. We therefore combined these
privacy aspects in the privacy of state of body & mind category.
Our five types of privacy (see Figure 2) can thus be described
as follows:
Privacy of Location. Location information does not only
include the location itself but also when and for how long it was
visited. Location privacy is usually defined as the protection
of spatio-temporal information. Violating location privacy can
reveal a person’s home and workplace, but also allow inferences
about other types of privacy, for example habits, purchase
patterns, or health [34]. In addition, co-location information
allows inferences about a person’s social life.
Privacy of State of Body & Mind. The state of body and
mind encompasses a person’s bodily characteristics including
biometrics, their health, genome, mental states, emotions,
opinions, and thoughts. Violating the privacy of the state of
body and mind can lead to discrimination by employers and
insurance companies or even to prosecution by totalitarian
regimes.
Privacy of Social Life. A person’s social life includes the
contents of social interactions, for example what was said
in a conversation or posted on a social media platform, as
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Ubiquitous Connectivity [63] [64] [65] [63] [65] [63] [63] [65] [63] [65]
Smart Cards [66] [66] [67] [67]
Open Data [68] [69] [70] [71] [71] [69] [72]
(Participatory) Sensor Networks [29] [40] [73] [40] [73] [73] [13]
Wearable Devices [74] [75] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [77]
Internet of Things [47] [79] [47] [48] [80] [81] [80] [82]
Autonomous Systems [83] [84] [84] [84] [84] [84] [84] [85]
Intelligent Vehicles [86] [87] [88] [86] [88] [89] [88] [90] [88]
Cloud Computing [91] [81] [47] [22] [81] [81] [82]
TABLE I
The most common attackers and data sources for each enabling technology, and the privacy types that are directly affected by the technology (we do not
include privacy types that are affected by correlation with other data).
well as metadata about interactions, for example who a person
interacts with, when, and for how long. Violating social privacy
allows inferences about other types of privacy, e.g., interactions
with specialized hospitals or political groupings can reveal
information about a person’s health or opinion.
Privacy of Behavior & Action. The privacy of behavior
and action includes a person’s habits, hobbies, actions, and
purchase patterns. When shopping online or when using credit
cards, potentially intimate details are shared with retailers.
Exploiting this information for other purposes such as targeted
advertisement can constitute a violation of privacy. Often, this
information allows to draw far-reaching conclusions about the
user’s life and therefore other types of privacy.
Privacy of Media.Media privacy includes privacy of images,
video, audio, and other data about a person [13]. This includes
CCTV and other (knowingly or unknowingly taken) camera
footage or media uploaded to the Internet. Redistributing
or creating user-related media without consent constitutes a
privacy violation.
D. Attackers and Data sources
Privacy protections in smart cities need to be designed
and implemented with different attackers in mind. Metrics
to measure the privacy enjoyed by users in a system heavily
depend on the type (and capabilities) of an attacker [92], [93].
Attackers can be defined using orthogonal dimensions [94],
[95]: they can be internal or external, passive or active, global or
local, and static or adaptive. Their capabilities can vary in terms
of resources (e.g., network coverage, computational power),
the employed algorithms (e.g., restriction to algorithms with
probabilistic polynomial time), and also depend on the level of
prior knowledge and available information (e.g., information
from a side channel or scenario-specific knowledge). This
classification is useful when investigating a specific attack or
when measuring privacy properties such as anonymity [94],
but is overly specific when discussing general privacy threats
for a broad area such as the smart city. We therefore focus
on the attacker’s role in the smart city and distinguish Service
Providers, Involved Parties, and Third Parties (see bottom half
of Figure 3).
Service Providers. Service providers include utility com-
panies collecting smart meter readings, providers of location-
based services, Internet service providers, cloud computing
services, and the government. They have direct access to the
data collected by their services and may have incentives to
repurpose this data.
Involved Parties. Involved parties include device manufac-
turers (for example of wearables, smart cards, vehicles, or
CCTV cameras), software developers, and other users who
can authenticate to the system but may behave maliciously.
Involved parties may gain access to potentially sensitive data.
Third Parties. We refer to all entities that are neither a
service provider nor involved with the infrastructure and devices
as third parties. They include external attackers who may not
be able to authenticate to the system but acquire data through
other channels.
Attackers in smart city scenarios can use four sources of
data to attack privacy: Observable Data, Repurposed Data,
Published Data, and Leaked Data (see top half of Figure 3).
Attacks based on Observable Data. Observable data
can be acquired by eavesdropping on wireless and wired
communication. The attacker is passive, but needs to be
present at a physical location where the communication can
be overheard.
Attacks based on Repurposed Data. Repurposed data has
been collected for a specific purpose, but is then repurposed
for a different cause. The attacker could be a service provider,
for example for location-based services, who uses user data not
only to provide the service, but also to profile users. According
to contextual integrity [58], repurposing data without user
consent always constitutes a privacy violation.
Attacks based on Published Data. Published data is
available to the public. This includes statistical data from open
government platforms as well as data that individuals choose
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Fig. 3. Attackers and data sources used by attackers.
to reveal. The attacker can correlate published data with other
data to infer information about individuals.
Attacks based on Leaked Data. Leaked data was intended
to stay private, but has been obtained by the attacker, for
example through software flaws, security vulnerabilities, misuse
of authorized access, or social engineering. These leaks have
been common in the past and should therefore be expected
[96]. However, the implications on privacy can be severe if this
data is not protected, and the consequences for data holders
include large fines and a loss of reputation. Perfect protection
is unlikely, however, a combination of the privacy technologies
we present in Sections III and IV can considerably decrease
the impact and risk of a data leak.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
In this section, we briefly review key building blocks for
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that have been devel-
oped over the past decades. Because smart city applications
combine a range of enabling technologies, it is plausible that
existing privacy mechanisms for these enabling technologies
can be reused in the context of smart city applications. We
will refer back to these technologies from Section IV, when
we discuss privacy challenges and solutions for smart cities,
and we will outline open issues and challenges in Section V.
PETs are used to achieve or protect certain privacy prop-
erties. The type of privacy that PETs protect depends on
the context in which they are used, for example location
privacy in smart mobility, or privacy of body & mind in
smart health. In contrast, privacy properties as defined by
Pfitzmann and Hansen [60] are independent of the context.
They define six key privacy properties: anonymity, unlinkability,
undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and identity
management. Anonymity means that a subject is not identifiable
within a set of subjects; unlinkability refers to the property
that two actions or individuals cannot be linked by an attacker;
undetectability means that an attacker cannot sufficiently
distinguish whether an item of interest exists; unobservability
requires undectectability and the anonymity of all involved
entitites; pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as identifiers
instead of real names; and identity management refers to
managing of partial identities, such as pseudonyms. In addition
to these six properties, PETs often provide confidentiality to
ensure that message contents cannot be read by unauthorized
parties.
A. Process-Oriented Privacy Protection
We begin with privacy techniques that address the process
of developing and operating privacy-friendly systems and are
thus applicable to most technologies.
Privacy by Design. Privacy by design is often mentioned
as a strategy to fix privacy issues in smart cities [13], [22],
[15]. Privacy by design encompasses seven principles that
should be followed [97]: proactive privacy protection instead
of remedial action after privacy violations have happened;
privacy as the default setting; privacy embedded into the
design; full functionality with full privacy protection; privacy
protection through the entire lifecycle of the data; visibility
and transparency; and respect for user privacy. However, this
definition of the privacy by design principles is quite vague and
sometimes circular [96]. In addition, [98] argues that privacy
by design – in the form of Privacy Impact Assessments –
needs to be legally mandated (instead of relying on voluntary
compliance) to “protect the core values of our Western liberal
democracies and constitutions.”
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to incorporate these
principles into the design of new systems. For example, [99]
uses two principles, proactivity and end-to-end security, to
guide the design of a remote health monitoring solution, and
[100] apply the transparency principle to intelligent transport
systems. Gürses et al. [96] argue that, although not explicitly
listed in the seven principles, data minimization should be the
core of privacy by design. We discuss data minimization as a
data-oriented privacy protection in the next section.
Privacy Requirements Engineering. To apply privacy by
design to the smart city in a systematic way, the principles
need to be incorporated into a privacy engineering process. For
example, the process proposed in [96] starts with functional
requirements analysis and data minimization, then considers
attackers, threats and additional security requirements, and
finally implements and tests the design. To incorporate privacy
requirements into a standard software engineering process,
[101] proposes eight privacy design strategies. Four strategies
concern data (minimize, hide, separate, and aggregate), and
four strategies concern process (inform, control, enforce, and
demonstrate).
Privacy considerations can also be integrated into a formal
requirements engineering process. For example, PriS is a
privacy requirements engineering method that can be used
on top of an existing goal modeling method (e.g., Enterprise
Knowledge Development (EKD), KAOS, or Secure Tropos)
to elicit a smart city’s privacy requirements [102]. To identify
privacy goals, PriS starts from the privacy properties defined
by Pfitzmann and Hansen [60] and proposes privacy-enhancing
technologies that satisfy each of the properties.
LINDDUN is another privacy requirements engineering
method that has been defined in analogy to STRIDE [103].
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after their initials: linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation,
detectability, disclosure of information, content unawareness,
policy and consent noncompliance), most of which correspond
to the privacy properties defined in [60]. LINDDUN then maps
these privacy threat types to elements of the system model,
aided by a library of threat tree patterns and a mapping of
privacy-enhancing technologies to privacy goals.
[104] compares PriS, LINDDUN, and Spiekermann’s Frame-
work for Privacy-Friendly System Design [105], and finds
that they can be mapped to a common conceptual framework
that helps to select the most suitable requirements engineering
method.
Testing and Verification. An important part of privacy-
friendly system design is privacy testing and verification to
ensure that the design and implementation of a system do
indeed fulfill its privacy requirements. According to MITRE,
privacy testing is not fundamentally different from other types
of testing and thus needs to be incorporated into existing
testing processes [106]. Testing approaches that are specific
to privacy requirements aim at finding information leaks from
applications, for example through black box differential fuzz
testing [107] or taint tracking, i.e. analysis of the information
flow of sensitive program inputs to program outputs [108],
[109]. The privacy properties of cryptographic protocols can
also be formally verified using formal languages such as the
applied pi calculus [110], using ontologies [111], or using
model-based approaches [112].
Transparency. Transparency concerns the issue that data
accumulates in the hands of governments and corporations,
while individuals neither know what data is being held about
them, nor can they exert control over their data [113]. To
increase transparency, the provider should openly communicate
what data is collected, what data is stored, how it is processed,
who it is shared with, and how it is protected [15]. For example,
cities could send citizens monthly reports of the data held about
them [114], and integrate this data report with an easy way
for citizens to correct or delete their data. Transparency may
increase the level of trust for the citizens [115] and thereby
increase acceptance of smart city applications.
Transparency also includes algorithmic transparency [116],
that is, openness about the algorithms used for data processing.
Algorithmic transparency can increase the level of perceived
privacy by explaining, in easily understandable ways, how
potentially privacy-invasive systems work. This applies to
almost every technology in the smart city, such as how smart
card data is processed, or how autonomous systems make
decisions.
Consent and Control. Consent is an important stipulation
for lawful data processing [32]. However, in a smart city
environment, traditional methods of acquiring consent may
break down. For example, users cannot review the privacy
policies of smart dustbins they pass on the way to work [32],
and there are no buttons to disable ambient audio monitoring
[13]. In a similar way, it can be difficult to give users control,
that is, the right to view, update, and delete data held about
them [101] because citizens may not even be aware that there
is data held about them.
Another aspect of control is to ensure that data is handled
according to each user’s privacy settings [12]. This type
of control can be realized using information flow control,
which allows to track the usage of sensitive data throughout
an application and has been implemented, for example, for
Android phones [109]. Policies on information flow can be
enforced, for example by trusted hardware [117].
Auditing and Accountability. Accountability in smart
cities has two different meanings: First, to hold the city
accountable for its use of citizen data and compliance with its
privacy policies, and second, to hold citizens accountable for
misbehavior, e.g., to make sure that citizens pay the correct
amounts for usage of public transport, toll roads, or energy.
Logging and auditing allow the smart city to demonstrate
that it complies with its privacy policies [118], [119]. This
encompasses the ability to determine when privacy breaches
have taken place, and which records are affected [101].
Independent audits also allow the public to understand how,
and how often, privacy-invasive technologies are being used,
whether they are being used for their stated purpose and how
well they fulfill this purpose [120].
Citizen accountability is supported by several data-oriented
privacy protections which we discuss in the next section.
Privacy Architectures. Privacy architectures are needed to
tie different protections together and ensure that there are no
privacy leaks at any point. For example, the architecture in
[121] relies on trusted remote data stores and a broker that
mediates access to the users’ data stores. Similarly, [12] uses
a broker to provide access control for centralized storage, and
[122] combines different cryptographic techniques to provide
privacy guarantees.
B. Data-Oriented Privacy Protection
Data Minimization. As discussed above, data minimization
can be derived from the privacy by design principles [96].
In smart cities, data minimization has already been used to
formally analyze architectural choices for eletronic toll pricing
[123] and to derive privacy-preserving solutions for big data
analysis [124].
A specific challenge to data minimization is that the sensors
of modern smart systems naturally gather more sensor data
than required for the envisioned task. We refer to this data
as collateral data. For example, cameras for specific tasks
such as face recognition or traffic surveillance also record
unrelated information, e.g., two persons holding hands or a
person limping. The system should therefore be designed to
limit the recorded data for the envisioned use case to avoid
exploitation.
Data Anonymization. k-Anonymity is a popular technique
aimed at preserving the privacy of individuals in public
releases of statistical databases by providing anonymity and
unlinkability. The key idea is that databases, for example with
medical information, contain both identifying information (e.g.,
the names of individuals) and sensitive information (e.g., their
medical conditions). Assuming that columns with identifying
information are removed before publication, k-anonymity then
groups the database rows into equivalence classes with at least
9k rows that are indistinguishable with respect to their quasi-
identifiers [125], [126]. Quasi-identifiers by themselves do not
identify users, but can do so when correlated with other data.
For example, the combination of the three quasi-identifiers ZIP
Code, date of birth, and gender identifies 87% of the American
population [126]. Each equivalence class contains all rows that
have the same values for each quasi-identifier, for example
all individuals with the same ZIP Code, date of birth, and
gender. To ensure that all equivalence classes have at least k
rows, several algorithms have been proposed to transform a
given database to make it k-anonymous, for example using
suppression or generalization [125] or random sampling [127].
However, k-anonymity has been shown to have shortcomings
that allow re-identification of individuals and/or their sensitive
information in several situations, for example with high-
dimensional data, multiple releases of the same database, or
when correlations with other data sources are possible. For this
reason, many variations of k-anonymity have been proposed,
for example l-diversity which ensures that sensitive values are
well-represented in each equivalence class [128], m-invariance
which can deal with multiple data releases [129], or t-closeness
which restricts the distribution of sensitive values [130] (see
[131] for a good survey of the most important variations).
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is a more modern
approach to database privacy that can provide unobservability.
In contrast to k-anonymity, differential privacy can give privacy
guarantees: any disclosure is equally likely (within a small
multiplicative factor ✏) regardless of whether or not an item
is in the database [132]. For example, the result of a database
query should be roughly the same regardless of whether the
database contains an individual’s record or not. This guarantee
is usually achieved by adding a small amount of random noise
to the results of database queries. Originally introduced for
interactive database queries, differential privacy has since been
extended to many other settings, for example non-interactive
data publishing [133], smart metering (and stream data in
general) [134], and location privacy [135].
Encryption. Encryption preserves privacy by protecting
the confidentiality of messages or other data. Traditionally,
symmetric encryption requires two parties to have a shared en-
/decryption key, while public-key encryption allows to encrypt
messages using a public key, and only the corresponding private
key can decrypt the messages.
Identity-based encryption is a type of public-key encryption
where the public key can be an arbitrary string, such as a
user’s name or email address [136]. This allows to encrypt
messages for a recipient even if the recipient has not generated
a public/private key pair. Identity-based encryption can be used
to realize private service discovery [137].
Attribute-based encryption is another type of public-key
encryption where both the private keys and the ciphertexts
depend on user attributes [138]. A user is only able to decrypt
a message if his key’s set of attributes matches the ciphertext’s
set of attributes. In this way, fine-grained access control on
encrypted data can be realized. In smart cities, attribute-based
encryption can be used to encrypt data for several groups
of recipients who share common attributes, such as doctors,
nurses, and patients [139], [140].
Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic encryption (HE)
is a cryptographic method that allows computations on en-
crypted data and thus protects confidentiality during data pro-
cessing. For example, the addition of two ciphertexts represent-
ing the encrypted numbers 2 and 3 would result in a ciphertext
representing the encrypted number 5. Partially homomorphic
cryptosystems are computationally feasible today, but they only
allow either addition (e.g., the Paillier cryptosystem [141])
or multiplication operations (e.g., the ElGamal cryptosystem
[142]), but not both. Fully homomorphic cryptosystems do not
have this restriction, but are still computationally expensive
[143], even though there has been significant progress in the
past years [144].
The appeal of homomorphic encryption in smart city
applications is that it can be used to allow third parties to
process sensitive data without getting to know the inputs or
outputs of the computations. For example, HE has been used
to design privacy-preserving solutions for smart metering [79],
genomic tests [145], and recommender systems [146].
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs [147] are
a cryptographic method that allows one party (the prover)
to prove their knowledge of some fact to another party (the
verifier), without revealing the fact or any other information
[148]. Zero-knowledge proofs ensure that a cheating prover
who does not know the fact cannot convince the verifier (the
soundness property), and that a cheating verifier does not learn
any other information (the zero-knowledge property).
Zero-knowledge proofs provide confidentiality and privacy-
preserving accountability. For example, they can be used for
authentication, allowing the user to prove that they know the
password without revealing it. They also allow to enforce honest
behavior, for example to prove that the steps of a protocol
were followed correctly. This has already been used to design
solutions for smart metering [47], [149] and electronic toll
pricing [150].
Secret Sharing. Secret sharing is a method that allows to
distribute secret information among several participants [151].
Typically, the secret is split into n shares, each participant
receives one share, and a minimum of t shares is required
to recover the secret. Thus, secret sharing provides both
confidentiality (a single share does not allow recovery of the
secret) and reliability (n t shares can be lost without affecting
recovery).
In smart cities, secret sharing can be used in solutions for
data aggregation (e.g., from participatory sensor networks [152]
or smart meters [153]), for distributed data storage [154], and
for decentralized enforcement of k-anonymity [155].
Anonymous/Pseudonymous Digital Credentials. Anony-
mous digital credentials provide a privacy-preserving way for
individuals to prove facts about them, for example whether
they are a legitimate sender or have a specific attribute such
as age or nationality, without revealing their identity.
For blind signatures, an authority signs messages without
being able to read the message contents [156]. In this way, the
authority attests that it has verified the message author’s identity,
but the signature does not reveal this identity. In smart cities,
blind signatures have been proposed to verify that messages
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were sent by legitimate vehicles, without revealing the vehicle
identities [157].
Anonymous credentials [158] allow users to obtain creden-
tials from authorities and use these credentials while ensuring
that transactions cannot be linked to each other or to the
user. Attribute-based credentials rely on anonymous credentials
and add features for revocation and de-anonymization [159].
Attribute-based credentials have many potential uses in smart
cities, for example to allow users to authenticate with cloud
providers without revealing their identities [19].
Pseudonymous credentials can be realized using a public-
key infrastructure. The certificate authority issues a long-term
certificate and a pool of pseudonymous certificates to each user.
The long-term certificate is only used to obtain pseudonyms
from the certificate authority to prevent re-identification of
users. Pseudonyms are used for communication with other
users and are only valid if signed by the certificate authority.
Thus, receivers can check the validity, but not the identity of
other users using the certificate authority’s public key, and
only the certificate authority can link pseudonyms to user
identities. In smart cities, pseudonymous credentials are used
in the industry standards for intelligent vehicles [88], [160]
to ensure that drivers enjoy location privacy while still being
accountable for their actions in traffic.
To improve privacy protection, the certificate authority can be
separated into two entities, one for issuing long-term certificates
and one for issuing pseudonyms. This is similar to direct
anonymous attestation (DAA) [161] where each participant
obtains a certificate from the DAA issuer. When receiving
a message, the receiver contacts the DAA verifier who uses
zero-knowledge proofs to verify the sender’s credential. DAA
thus requires the active participation of the certificate authority
in every communication or transaction.
Anonymous and pseudonymous credentials provide
anonymity and pseudonymity, respectively, as well as
unlinkability. Both methods can allow authorities to
de-anonymize users, thus providing accountability.
Secure Multi-Party Computation. Secure multi-party com-
putation is a cryptographic method that allows two or more
parties to jointly compute the value of a public function
without revealing the parties’ private inputs, and without
relying on a trusted third party [162]. Secure multi-party
computations provide confidentiality and unlinkability. They
are computationally expensive, but real-world applications have
already been reported, for example to realize auctions where
the final price can be computed without revealing individual
bids [163].
In smart cities, secure multi-party computations can be used
to design healthcare solutions, for example to compute the
results of genomic tests where both the patient’s genome and
the test sequence remain private [164].
Private Information Retrieval. Private information retrieval
allows clients to query database servers without revealing the
query or the query results to the server. Private information
retrieval provides confidentiality, unlinkability, and undetectabil-
ity. The simplest method to achieve private information retrieval
is for the server to send the entire database regardless of the
query. If servers are computationally bounded or if there are
multiple non-colluding servers holding copies of the database,
several protocols have been proposed that achieve private
information retrieval at a lower communication cost [165].
In smart cities, private information retrieval can be used to
hide access patterns to data stored in the cloud [166], [167].
C. No Privacy without Security
Security and privacy are closely related terms and effective
privacy protection is almost impossible without security. This
article focuses on conceptual privacy challenges and solutions
in smart cities. For example, a public camera placed to record
and transmit images of individuals is a privacy problem by
design, whereas failing to safeguard the communication of
the camera to the back-end server is a security problem that
leads to a privacy problem. The line between conceptual and
security-related privacy challenges is blurred and therefore
it is short-sighted to talk about privacy protection without
outlining the security challenges of smart city technology. In
this section, we give a brief overview of security challenges
and problems that are of interest for most of the discussed
smart city technologies.
The list of guidelines and principles to design secure
computer systems is long and certainly out of scope for this
article. We refer the reader for challenges specifically for
embedded systems, and therefore for many smart city devices,
to [168]. Here, we briefly review some of the most important
concepts.
System security and access control. Privacy protection
in the smart city often depends on the security of the
systems and subsystems within it. For example, if attackers
can compromise smart home devices, they can spy on the
inhabitants or even gain physical access to the home (see
[169] for a survey on security issues of the smart home and
smart grid). This is not a conceptual privacy problem of the
smart home idea, but a consequence of flawed or nonexistent
security measures. This problem can be observed for many
smart city technologies, including the IoT, wearable devices,
sensor networks, autonomous systems, and intelligent vehicles,
especially when these devices support a wide range of protocols
and include many software components. This is naturally the
case for mobile phones that, when compromised, can lead
to a complete violation of user privacy (see [170] and [64]
for surveys on mobile phone security and privacy). The fact
that users can actively download third-party software onto the
devices furthermore opens up the problem of malware [171].
The sensory interfaces of many smart devices also pose a
security challenge. It has been shown that the sensory channel
of cyber-physical systems can be used to infect devices with
malware [172], which can then be used for privacy violations.
Similar attacks have been illustrated in the scope of intelligent,
autonomous vehicles where LiDAR and other sensors can be
influenced to affect short-term and long-term driving decisions
of the cars [173].
Access control restricts access to stored data to authorized
individuals, for example city employees [12], [15], [68]. While
access control is necessary, it does not prevent the misuse
of authorized access. Besides traditional access control for
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unencrypted data, attribute-based encryption also enables fine-
grained access control for encrypted data [138]. Information
flow control can track data as it flows through a system and
enforce the data owner’s access policies [174].
Access control is especially important for autonomous
systems with an Internet connection through which devices can
be compromised and remote-controlled. Unlike a compromised
fridge where the worst case damage seems manageable, the
actuators (wheels, grapplers, etc.) on modern robots allow an
adversary to carry out a wide range of tasks that can cause
damage to property and to persons [84].
Protocol and network security. Cryptographic protocols,
for example, to establish a secure confidential communication
channel, make use of cryptographic primitives, e.g., crypto-
graphic hash functions or encryption algorithms. Although these
primitives might be unknown to be susceptible to any feasible
attack, an improperly designed protocol based on them may
be [175]. This is challenging in terms of privacy, because just
as these primitives are building blocks for security protocols,
the security protocols are building blocks for privacy protection.
If the underlying security architecture can be compromised,
then privacy is at risk through an attack based on leaked
data (see Section II-D). The impact can only be mitigated by
carefully designing the system in a privacy-aware manner (see
Section III-A).
Even without security problems, flaws in communication
protocols can lead to privacy issues. For example, it has been
shown that the 6LoWPAN stack includes header information
that can be exploited to locate the device or even track
activities of the user [176]. Hence, each system building on
flawed protocols may leak information beyond what it has
been designed for. Developers of a smart city applications
should therefore always check whether the entire protocol
stack supports the envisioned privacy goals.
Information leakage. Side channels, such as timing or
power consumption, can leak information even if a system
is secured by cryptography. These side-channel attacks can
lead to privacy violations, e.g. when analyzing the com-
munication of smart meters [177], IoT devices [178], or
intelligent vehicles [179]. Location inference attacks can also
use side channels (e.g., smartphones accelerators [180] or radio
frequency fingerprinting [181]) to identify the location of a
device or user. In general, the problem of a system revealing
more information than intended needs to be carefully considered
in the context of smart city technology, as every piece of
information may be used by an attacker to break the security
and privacy of the system.
IV. PRIVACY CHALLENGES & SOLUTIONS
The complexity and number of smart city applications,
technologies, and attackers make it hard to keep track of the
privacy risks for citizens. It is often not the application itself
that poses a risk but the way an application uses the underlying
technologies. For example, cashless payment methods for
public transportation do not constitute a privacy risk per se, but
can be implemented in a privacy-invading way, for example by
using smart cards that transmit identifying information (e.g.,
“Card holder is John Doe, 65, holds a severely handicapped pass,
and has visited locations A and B earlier today”). We therefore
structure this section along the nine enabling technologies
in our taxonomy (see Figure 1, p. 2). For each technology,
we discuss privacy issues, privacy-friendly solutions, and give
examples how the technology is already used in real cities.
Table II shows which data-oriented privacy protections
have already been applied to the enabling technologies and
outlines how each solution preserves privacy. Missing entries
in this table do not imply that these mechanisms are generally
infeasible for a given technology, but only that we are not
aware of literature applying the mechanism in the given context.
Table III summarizes the examples of real smart cities we give
in this section, as well as their applications, potential privacy
issues, and what privacy protections are in place. We also give
a (naturally subjective) rating how well privacy protection was
addressed in each case.
A. Ubiquitous Connectivity
4G connectivity is already widespread in today’s cities, and
many cities are supplementing paid-for 4G connectivity with
free WiFi access. Ubiquitous connectivity can be a privacy
risk because (1) mobile Internet providers can track their users
via cell tower and hot spot locations, (2) providers can read
unencrypted user traffic, and (3) third parties can eavesdrop
on the wireless channel.
Privacy for the Communication Channel. Traffic over
public hot spots is not necessarily encrypted and can thus be
monitored by the access point, all intermediate nodes, and other
people in the vicinity. For example, [65] found that more than
two thirds of airport WiFi users leaked personal information
through name resolution queries, HTTP content, and profiled
advertisements. From a smart city provider’s perspective, this
privacy leakage can be countered by offering encrypted wireless
communication (e.g., WPA2), and securing all web services and
mobile apps using SSL/TLS. Even though the use of SSL/TLS
is common, erroneous usage of the protocol can cause privacy
leaks, for example due to lacking certificate validation [182],
[183]. Erroneous usage can be detected by static analysis tools
[184], and validation can be improved with dynamically linked
validation libraries [185].
Privacy for Metadata. Ensuring the confidentiality of
communication content is not sufficient to ensure privacy,
because the communication metadata (who communicates with
whom, when, and how long) needs to be protected as well.
For example, the fact that a patient communicates with a
particular physician may reveal certain health issues. This
risk can be mitigated by using specialized protocols, for
example to hide the connection between patient and physician
[186], or by using Onion Routing (e.g., Tor) [187] as a
general-purpose tool for anonymous communication. However,
the required technical knowledge to properly operate these
tools may make them inaccessible for a majority of citizens.
A possible way to overcome this problem is to have pre-
installed and pre-configured software packages on smartphones
or computers, and to generally increase the awareness of
this privacy challenge, possible solutions, and the existence
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of easy-to-use integrated browser solutions. Unfortunately,
even anonymous communication protocols may leak private
information through various attacks [188], for example traffic
correlation [189] or timing attacks [190].
Fingerprinting. Even when public Internet is used anony-
mously, fingerprinting techniques using static MAC addresses,
browser and system parameters [191], clock skew [192], or
frame inter-arrival times [193] allow to track and re-identify
users. Protections against website and device fingerprinting
include changing device identifiers frequently [194], randomiz-
ing browser fingerprints [195], and inserting cover traffic [196].
However, protections against physical-layer identification of
wireless devices are still underexplored [197].
Privacy for Mobile Devices. The use of mobile devices for
ubiquitous connectivity also brings privacy challenges. Modern
mobile devices are equipped with a multitude of sensors which
in principle allow for the pervasive monitoring of users. In
addition, these devices consist of various components developed
by different parties with different goals and incentives, which
makes the protection of sensitive user data more difficult. As
a result, existing privacy solutions often focus only on a small
part of the mobile device ecosystem and thus leave the user
vulnerable [64].
For example, the baseband processor which is needed for
cellular communications runs a separate operating system (in
addition to Android or iOS) that most users do not know about.
The baseband processor has access to the phone’s microphone
and often also to the phone’s main memory. Together, these
can be used for remote audio surveillance and reveal a user’s
location and private data [198].
Privacy risks are also introduced through the use of third-
party applications. Even though both Android and iOS employ
permission models to restrict the data that third-party apps can
access, apps often request more permissions than necessary,
and users often grant permissions that are more far-reaching
than expected [199]. We refer the reader to a recent survey
by Spensky et al. [64] for a more detailed discussion of these
issues.
State of the Art Examples. Hong Kong offers free WiFi
access at more than 600 locations in the city [63]. The WiFi is
accessible to everybody without prior registration, and a public
username and password is used for WPA2 encryption. However,
the government reserves the right to record and analyze a log
of activities for each user, including their browsing history.
These records can be requested by law enforcement. The
corresponding app HK GovWiFi asks for full network access,
location, phone identity, and full access to the phone’s storage.
Chicago, IL aims to increase Internet accessibility by
providing free WiFi at a number of public places, low-cost
fiber access, and subsidized Internet access in underprivileged
residential areas [200]. Chicago’s WiFi is open and not secured,
and therefore accessible to everybody. However, we were not
able to find information about the privacy policies of the free
and subsidized services in Chicago. In particular, it is unclear
whether a user’s browsing history will be recorded.
The country of Estonia also offers free WiFi access at many
public places. However, even though the Estonian constitution
enshrines a right to privacy, Estonian law requires Internet
Service Providers to store communications metadata, including
the user’s browsing history, for one year [201].
Projects to increase connectivity have also been initiated
by communities and commercial Internet service providers.
Community-driven mesh networks can provide connectivity for
citizens who cannot afford it, and serve as a resilient network
in case of emergencies [202].
B. Smart Cards
The main privacy issue in smart cards is the logging of
transactions. For example, transactions in public transport can
disclose spatio-temporal information about the card holder.
These mobility patterns can include locations, habits, and
visits to sensitive places or events. When data from different
users is correlated, possible links between them can also be
revealed. Information collected by smart cards can contribute
to optimizing public transport schedules, however, it can also
be repurposed for advertising, profiling, and tracking.
Separation of authentication and service. Separating
user authentication from the service accessed by the user
is a step towards providing unlinkability between users and
transactions [220]. In some cases, this separation can be
achieved by not including identifying information on the smart
card, i.e., by using anonymous, pre-paid smart cards. In other
cases, for example when the smart card is used to access
buildings or to buy discounted bus tickets, the user needs to
be authenticated to ensure that they are allowed to access the
service. Even in cases where authentication is required, it is not
necessary to create a link between user and transaction. Instead,
attribute-based credentials allow the system to cryptographically
verify certain of the user’s attributes (for example, a student
or discounted fares attribute would indicate that the user is
entitled to discounted bus fares) without revealing the user
identity [159].
Data minimization. The separation of authentication and
service alone does not guarantee privacy because service data is
often sufficient to re-identify individuals, for example the origin-
destination pairs collected from a public transport smart card
can reveal a person’s identity [227]. This can be addressed by
minimizing the amount of data collected and stored. The card’s
unique identifier can allow tracking and re-identification of
users and should therefore not be stored [203]. In transportation,
it is often sufficient to know the departing public transport zone
instead of the exact bus stop to determine the price for a bus
ride. Also, dynamic pricing can be done without a connection to
a back end server, minimizing the collected information about
each user. If fine-grained information is needed to optimize
transport schedules, the system could instead record counts of
passengers getting on/off at each stop.
State of the Art Examples. In Zaragoza (Spain) the tarjeta
ciudadana (literally “citizen card”) [20] aims to integrate
services and make it easier for citizens to interact with city
infrastructure. The Zaragoza smart card serves as photo ID,
member card to access different city services, and payment
method. Among others, the card can be used to access and/or
pay for the public bus system, car parking, sports centers,
municipal WiFi, museums, and libraries. The city asserts
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PET Technology Privacy-Preserving Solution
Data Minimization
Ubiquitous Connectivity Use minimal permissions for mobile apps, avoid use of third-party libraries [64]
Smart Cards Do not store identifiers of smart cards [203]
(Participatory) Sensor Networks Isolate sensors from other systems, optimize placement to collect no PII [13]
Extract relevant features on sensor, discard raw data [204]
Separate entities that ask for and receive sensor readings [40]
Wearable Devices Reduce time and location granularity on device [205], [206]
Extract relevant features on device, discard raw data [78]
Internet of Things Process data for smart metering on device, discard raw data [47], [149]
Intelligent Vehicles Process data for toll pricing on device, discard raw data [150]
Require cooperation of multiple entities to de-anonymize vehicles [207]
Data Anonymization
Ubiquitous Connectivity Change device identifiers frequently to prevent fingerprinting [194], randomize
browser fingerprints [195], insert cover traffic [196]
Open Data Release only data that satisfy k-anonymity[208], l-diversity [128], m-
invariance[129], or t-closeness [130]
(Participatory) Sensor Networks Ensure k-anonymity of sensor readings [155]
Ensure spatio-temporal readings cover at least k individuals [73], [209], [40]
Use l-diversity [128] or hierarchical map quantization [210] to prevent location
semantics attacks against k-anonymity
Internet of Things Cluster IoT data streams and only release clusters with at least k members [211]
Differential Privacy
Open Data Release noisy aggregates of data [212], e.g., public transport data [213]
(Participatory) Sensor Networks Obfuscate locations with planar Laplace noise [135], [214]
Internet of Things Apply noise to meter readings [134]
Encryption
Ubiquitous Connectivity Ensure correct usage of SSL/TLS with static analysis [184]
Ensure correct usage of SSL/TLS with dynamically linked libraries [185]
Secure public WiFi with WPA2 [65]
Use anonymous communication to protect metadata [186], e.g. Tor [187]
Wearable Devices Avoid storing encryption keys on device [215]
Use cryptographically enforced role-based access control [216]
Internet of Things Use identity-based encryption for private service discovery [137]
Cloud Computing Use attribute-based encryption for access control [139], [140]
Homomorphic Encryption
(Participatory) Sensor Networks Aggregate sensor readings from multiple participants privately [217]
Internet of Things Aggregate data over multiple participants [79], e.g. energy consumption [218]
Cloud Computing Privately process data at third parties [143]
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Internet of Things Enforce honesty of device for local processing, e.g., for smart meters [47], [149]Intelligent Vehicles Enforce honesty of vehicle for local processing, e.g. for electronic tolling [150]
Secret Sharing
Open Data Use privacy-preserving data aggregation [219]
(Participatory) Sensor Networks Enforce k-anonymity of sensor readings cryptographically [155]
Compute statistics over sensor readings from multiple participants privately [152]
Internet of Things Aggregate data over multiple participants privately [153], [218]
Wearable Devices Use secure distributed data storage [154]
Anonymous/Pseudonymous
Credentials
Smart Cards Authenticate users without identifying them [220], [159]
Intelligent Vehicles Use short-lived pseudonyms for car-to-car communication [160], [221], [222]
Preserve backwards-privacy when revoking pseudonyms [223], [89]
Eliminate mapping between short-term and long-term identifiers [157]
Cloud Computing Authenticate users based on attributes instead of identities [19]
Secure Multi-Party
Computation
Cloud Computing Process data with private inputs [224], e.g. genomic tests [164]
Perform privacy-preserving data mining over distributed datasets [225]
Private Information Retrieval
(Participatory) Sensor Networks Ensure query privacy in location-based services [226]
Cloud Computing Hide access patterns to remote files [167]
Hide access patterns to remote databases [166]
TABLE II
Examples of how privacy-enhancing technologies have already been applied to smart city technologies.
that no personal data is stored on the card. However, if a
citizen ceases to be registered with the city of Zaragoza, the
card will automatically be declined at public facilities. To
realize this function, the card id has to be checked against an
authentication/authorization server that links the card id to the
citizen, even if the card itself does not store personal data. For
payment, the card can be both pre- and post-paid. In the latter
case, it requires citizens to have an account with a cooperating
bank. Information on privacy and data protection from the
public-facing website of the Zaragoza city council [228] states
that (1) data is stored by the city council with the purpose of
creating and managing the citizen card, (2) data is not shared
with third parties except where necessary to provide the card
services, (3) the council can cross-reference data generated by
the card with other municipal databases, and (4) citizens have
the right to access, correct, and delete data held about them.
However, there is no information regarding the extent of data
stored or the names of third party providers. In addition, there
is no public information about specific privacy technologies
used.
In Hong Kong, the Octopus card allows users to pay for
transportation, parking, and shopping [22] and gain access to
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buildings, schools, and hospitals. The Octopus card collects
personal information about its users and card usage. The
privacy policy permits use of the collected data not only for
management and operation of the card, but also marketing [67].
In 2010, Octopus confirmed that it had sold information about
2 million customers to third parties [66], and claimed that
doing so had not violated their terms and conditions.
In Malaysia, the MyKad smart card goes even further in
that it serves not only as a compulsory national identity card,
but also as driver’s license, health card, transit card, and debit
card [229]. In addition, many other applications use MyKad
for authentication, for example schools, theme parks, and
businesses. The MyKad number leaks the holder’s date/place
of birth and gender, and it is unclear whether access control
to information on the card is enforced effectively [230].
C. Open Data
While traditional open government platforms publish data
related to government activities, smart cities can collect
a large amount of data about citizens which should not
be published as-is because open data should not allow to
identify individuals. However, simply removing all personally
identifying information is not a sufficient protection against
de-anonymization. For example, it has been shown that the
combination of ZIP Code, date of birth, and gender uniquely
identifies 87% of the US population [208], and that high-
dimensional data, such as a database of movie ratings, can be
linked back to individuals by correlating it with other (public)
data [72].
Aggregation. The publication of aggregated data can reduce
privacy concerns. Data can be aggregated over time periods,
individuals, or geographic areas. Aggregation is most effective
if the raw data is hidden even from the service provider, which
can be achieved by using cryptographic protocols, for example
based on homomorphic encryption [219] (see also Section III-B
and references in Sections IV-D and IV-F).
Obfuscation. Similarly, the publication of obfuscated data,
i.e. data that has been sanitized through generalization, suppres-
sion, or randomization, can also reduce privacy concerns. For
example, k-anonymity ensures that each individual’s record is
indistinguishable from at least k   1 other records [125], and
several enhancements of k-anonymity have been proposed to
mitigate its vulnerabilities [131] (see also Section III-B).
In contrast to k-anonymity, differential privacy can give
privacy guarantees by adding noise to the results of database
queries [212]. While originally introduced for the interactive
setting (answering database queries), it has since been expanded
to cover data publication and data streams [231].
State of the Art Examples. Almere (Netherlands) operates
the data platform StraatKubus which provides geographical
information on the street level, including personal data such
as household income, age ranges, rent arrears, and school
failures. The purpose is to allow social workers and police
to spot problem areas early on. To comply with privacy regu-
lations, Almere created a detailed privacy impact assessment
(“Gedragsrichtlijn”) that explains the purpose of data collection
for every goal of the StraatKubus and details how data may
be stored and processed. As a result, only employees of the
municipality can access the data, and only if they need it to
perform specific tasks [68].
The Hague (Netherlands) aims at creating an open data
platform incorporating data about safety and liveability [68].
The city dashboard of The Hague [70] – and of many other
cities in the Netherlands – features live updates on recent
ambulance calls and fire alarms which include street address,
priority, and timestamp. This data is based on messages on
the unencrypted P2000 network, the dispatch system for all
emergency services in the Netherlands. A number of websites
exist which link the information in P2000 messages with maps
and street views [71]. This has already led to privacy violations
of the individuals requesting emergency services. So-called
photo cowboys listen to P2000 messages to arrive early at
emergency scenes to take photographs. Despite this, a 2013
initiative to encrypt P2000 messages was unsuccessful and one
representative of a photo cowboy organization claimed that
“the argument of privacy is nonsense” [69] because the P2000
messages do not include the reason for the emergency.
Sydney (Australia) has an open data policy that requires
government data to be open by default, subject to appropriate
privacy policies and “management of privacy for the individual”.
In a recent example, two weeks of tap-on tap-off data for
public transport in Sydney were published. The data release
states that “the tap on and tap off counts are not linked and
individual trips cannot be derived using the data,” and that
the release uses differential privacy in combination with time
and geographical aggregation [232]. According to a separately
published technical report [233], the parameters for (✏,  )-
differential privacy were ✏ = 8 and   ⇡ 2 20. However, the
value for ✏ is considered to be rather large, and due to small
application errors, the data may still leak information about the
presence or absence of individuals in specific circumstances
and with low probability [213]. Even so, the combination of
using state-of-the-art privacy protection and publishing both
algorithm details and parameters is very good practice.
The Chicago Health Atlas publishes health-related data, for
example statistics about common conditions, health insurance,
hospital admissions, and demographics. The data is available
on a neighborhood level (approx. 16 city blocks) and can
be downloaded, displayed on a map, and plotted in time
series plots that compare a neighborhood with the city-wide
average. Before publication, the data has been anonymized
to ensure that no individuals can be identified from the data.
Although there is no public information about the method of
anonymization, [234] suggests that the Chicago Health Atlas
used k-anonymity with k = 5, and applied both generalization
(age ranges, aggregation of geographic areas) and suppression
(no data about rare diseases with less than 5 patients) to achieve
k-anonymity.
D. (Participatory) Sensor Networks
Sensors have become a ubiquitous technology, pervading
both public and private environments. Unlike environmental
sensors (e.g., in forests or the ocean), sensors in the smart
city monitor the very space citizens live in and may thus
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collect sensitive data. CCTV systems, possibly coupled with
facial recognition or automatic number plate recognition, enable
the provider to track individuals throughout the city. Even
seemingly noncritical systems like occupancy sensors that
control light and heating in an office can reveal when an
individual is at work. Location-based services such as parking
spot finders disclose not only spatio-temporal user data, but
also user queries. The notion that individuals implicitly consent
to being monitored when moving in public space is worrying
because the lack of alternatives means that consent cannot be
meaningfully withheld.
Data Minimization. Personal information collected by
sensors can be minimized by isolating sensors from other
systems to avoid combination and correlation, by deleting
personal data, and by optimizing sensor placement so that no
personal information can be collected [13]. For many purposes
of sensor data collection, it is sufficient to extract relevant
features on the sensor and discard raw data to avoid collection
of collateral data. For example, face verification for access
control can be realized in a privacy-friendly way by extracting
feature vectors from faces and comparing them to stored feature
vectors [204]. In this way, no video data is stored, preserving
the privacy of bystanders and reducing the inferences that can
be made from clothes and personal appearance.
Aggregation. The privacy of participants in sensing ap-
plications can be protected by aggregating sensor readings
over multiple participants. In many use cases, including
smart buildings [209] or traffic monitoring [235], statistical
information about sensor readings (e.g., average, count, or
histogram) is sufficient to fully realize the application’s purpose.
These statistics can also be computed privately without a
trusted third party using secret sharing [152] or homomorphic
encryption [217].
Location Cloaking. The concept of k-anonymity (see Sec-
tion III-B) can be applied to location privacy by using as quasi-
identifiers the location and the time of the reading or user query
[73]. For example, in the case of occupancy sensors, spatio-
temporal cloaking can be achieved by dynamically adjusting
the size of the reported area and the time granularity until the
reading covers at least k individuals. This can be achieved by
a trusted anonymity server [73], by relying on collaboration
between all sensors [209], or by private information retrieval
which can guarantee privacy for continuous queries without
relying on a trusted third party [226].
In a participatory sensing system, achieving k-anonymity is
more challenging, as the reporting user devices cannot always
communicate with each other. An entry is then k-anonymous if
the report could have been generated by at least k other devices.
To achieve this, the size of the area can be pre-computed using
a tessellation approach based on empirical data [40]. Mobile
devices reporting a location will then replace the location in
their reading with the coordinates of the polygon to statistically
ensure their reading is k-anonymous. The downsides of this
method are that devices require a common data-set of a
potentially fast changing environment and that the statistical
approach does not allow to enforce k-anonymity. If sensing
devices are able to communicate with each other, they can
use secret sharing to cryptographically enforce k-anonymity of
their readings [155]. However, this potentially opens another
attack vector, namely for malicious users to de-anonymize
benign users.
In the case of location information, k-anonymity can be a
misleading metric. For example, when the target area is small
or not diverse enough (e.g., it contains only a single point of
interest), a reading can be privacy-critical if an attacker can
find out a certain individual is among the k users [236]. To
alleviate this, l-diversity [128] can make sure the area contains
at least l points of interest, and hierarchical map quantization
can ensure a consistent minimum size of cloaking regions
[210]. Privacy guarantees are possible with differential privacy,
for example by applying planar Laplace noise to obfuscate
locations [135], or by adjusting the noise distribution to the
point-of-interest density in an area [214].
Separation of knowledge. Splitting knowledge between
different entities can reduce the risk of privacy violations. In
order to access sensitive user information, these entities would
then have to collude. For example, in the participatory sensing
architecture presented in [40], Kapadia et al. split the entities
that query and receive reports from the users. They also suggest
the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) to allow the
server to authenticate the participants in a privacy-preserving
manner (see Section III-B).
State of the Art Examples. Glasgow’s (Scotland) operations
center combines CCTV footage from across the city with
automated video analysis to support traffic management and
policing [32]. Intelligent street lights sense the presence of
pedestrians or cyclists and adapt their lighting level accordingly.
The street lights also include sensors to measure air pollution
and noise levels, which feed back into the operations center
[11]. The city’s privacy policy indicates that the city relies on
policies and contracts with third parties to ensure compliance
with UK data protection law. Technical privacy protection is
not mentioned.
Rio de Janeiro’s center of operations integrates more than
30 departments, including emergency response, police, fire,
and health with the intention of improving the response to
natural disasters [10]. The center relies on location tracking of
emergency vehicles, CCTV, and a joint situation room for all
departments [29]. It is not clear whether this system processes
data about individuals, and, if so, how it handles privacy.
Eindhoven (Netherlands) used several sensing-based projects
in a popular nightlife area, the Stratumseind [68]. Audio sensors
are used to detect the level and direction of noise. To protect
privacy, these sensors do not record or transmit raw sound data.
Cameras are used to count the number of people on the street,
and instead of saving video or image data, the cameras detect
people, count them, and immediately discard the raw video data.
In partnership with Vodafone, Eindhoven uses mobile phone
location data to count people and determine where they come
from. To protect privacy, this data is aggregated to municipality
level and only reported when more than 15 phones from the
same municipality are present. Eindhoven also uses smart lights
to influence ambience in the street. For example, if noise level
and people counts indicate possible violence in the street, the
light color and intensity can be regulated to de-escalate the
situation [237]. None of the projects in Stratumseind store
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personal data, while fully achieving the original goal.
E. Wearable Devices
The main privacy threats for wearable devices come from
wireless eavesdropping, protocol design and software flaws, and
side channel attacks [75]. We note that protocol design flaws
include both security issues in protocol stacks [238] as well as
conceptual privacy issues, e.g., unnecessarily revealing sensitive
data to medical service providers. Sensor data can be used
to re-identify individuals and a wide range of their behaviors
and psychological states, for example using electrocardiograms
(ECG) and respiration sensors [206]. Privacy protection is thus
needed at all points that handle personal sensor data, i.e., the
wearable device itself, mobile devices that help transmit sensor
data [64], the communication channel (see Section IV-A), and
third party servers (see Section IV-I). If incorporated as part of
a participatory sensor network, then all the privacy challenges
of these networks (location tracking, disclosure of sensitive
information) also apply to wearable devices (see Section IV-D).
Privacy for Wearables. To protect privacy, wearable devices
can store the minimal amount of data necessary for their
purpose. In addition, utility-neutral aggregation is often possible
by adjusting the degree of time and location granularity [205].
For example, instead of a precise timestamp the wearable could
store only the duration of an event. This has been shown to
decrease privacy concerns [206].
Another privacy protection mechanism is to allow wearables
to operate offline by processing data locally instead of upload-
ing it to a service provider. If online operation is necessary,
pre-processing on the device can extract the relevant features
and discard the raw data stream. For example, a wearable
device that uses audio streams to detect coughing needs to
transmit this data to a physician for analysis. However, instead
of streaming raw audio data, it is possible to extract invertible
features from the audio stream which allows to reconstruct the
cough sounds while making speech unintelligible [78].
Finally, wearables that do need to make use of a service
provider can use homomorphic encryption (see Section III-B)
to ensure that the provider can store and process data without
being able to read it. For example, a wearable app for diabetics
can locally encrypt blood glucose and glycated hemoglobin
values, the cloud provider can process the encrypted data,
e.g. by comparing to thresholds or computing averages, and
a caregiver can decrypt and act on the processed values [99].
This solution has been implemented on a consumer-grade smart
watch and is thus computationally feasible today.
Privacy for Body Area Networks. The resource constraints
of body sensors pose a challenge for privacy protection in
wireless body area networks [239]. To avoid eavesdropping,
the communication from and between the sensors needs to be
secured. Furthermore, body area networks can be susceptible
to many active attacks already known in the context of
conventional and ad-hoc networks, e.g. routing or man-in-
the-middle attacks [240].
Additionally, sensitive data stored on the devices itself
constitutes a privacy risk, because even if encrypted, the
encryption key is often stored alongside [215]. Possible
solutions include secure distributed data storage based on secret
sharing [154] combined with fine-grained distributed role-based
access control [216].
State of the Art Examples. Oulu (Finland) prototyped a
city-wide running application that could track citizens’ runs
using the city’s WiFi infrastructure [77]. The application
allowed users to view statistics of their runs and find running
buddies. Privacy was addressed by automatically stopping to
track users after their run, however, other privacy technologies
were not deployed.
Medical wearables, such as implantable medical devices and
body area networks, collect more sensitive data and thus pose
complex privacy challenges [75]. In many countries, medical
regulations have strict requirements for the processing and
storage of medical data (e.g., HIPAA in the US) [74]. Fitness
wearables, however, are not restricted by medical regulations,
which means that companies can design their own privacy
policies. Paul and Irvine [74] found that only two of the four
reviewed providers of wearable devices assure that they do
not make commercial use of user-generated data, while one
asserts ownership of the data, and another reserves the right
to commercially exploit the data.
F. Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) enhances existing appliances
with sensing and communication capabilities to collect data and
enable applications such as smart homes or smart buildings.
This allows service providers and involved parties to learn
sensitive information about the people living in the monitored
space. For example, the contents of the smart fridge allow to
draw conclusions about a person’s nutrition and health [48] and
smart meter readings can disclose exactly when and how an
appliance in a household was used, or even which TV program
was watched [80].
The large amounts of data shared between devices and
potentially collected by the provider requires strong transport
and storage security concepts. The variety of different devices
also demands solutions that ensure that one compromised
device does not lead to the compromise of the entire system
(see [241] for a good review on the security challenges of the
IoT).
Many of the privacy mechanisms for sensor networks
can also be applied to the IoT (see Section IV-D). The
manufacturers of smart appliances often offer cloud services
as front-ends for remote control. In this case, the privacy
considerations for cloud computing (see Section IV-I) apply.
Data Minimization. Transferring data to manufacturers (or
service providers) makes it difficult for users to control what
data is being transferred and how it is used. This can be
countered by performing operations locally on the IoT device.
Cryptography can support device-local operations even if the
provider has to be assured of their correctness. For example,
time-of-use billing on smart meters can be realized with zero-
knowledge proofs [47], [149] (see also Section III-B).
Anonymization and Aggregation. In smart grids, many
grid management functions can be performed on aggregated
data of entire neighborhoods instead of single households
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without a loss of utility [242]. This aggregation can be
performed privately by a trusted third party [243], or even by
an untrusted aggregator using homomorphic encryption [218],
[79], secret sharing or bilinear maps [153].
IoT devices often leak sensitive data already during service
discovery, for example the owner’s name and the type of
service. Private service discovery allows devices to only
advertise their services to authorized clients, while clients
can reveal their identity only after they have verified that they
are communicating with the correct service [137]. Service
announcements are encrypted under the authorization policy
using identity-based encryption (see Section III-B) so that
only authorized clients can decrypt the announcements. Private
mutual authentication can be achieved in the same way.
Obfuscation. Obfuscation of energy measurements can be
achieved by modifying the load signatures with a rechargeable
battery [244], or by applying differential privacy [134]. IoT data
streams can also be k-anonymized by dynamically clustering
data and only releasing clusters with at least k members [211].
State of the Art Examples. Aspern, a suburb of Vienna
(Austria), aims to integrate smart buildings, smart metering, and
smart grids to optimize grid operation and energy consumption.
To achieve this, they embed sensors into the electricity grid
(e.g., power generation, voltage) and buildings (e.g., power con-
sumption, ventilation, heating, water), and use data analytics to
drive applications like grid anomaly detection and identification
of building energy patterns. Aspern also aims to provide an
open data platform that enables new business opportunities
based on data collected in the city [12]. The Aspern project
explores the use of privacy technologies in research, but relies
mainly on user consent in the current realization of the project.
Aspern recognizes that privacy policies do not inform citizens
well enough about the capabilities of smart city applications.
Therefore, the suburb additionally hosts information events and
utilizes Internet forums to inform and engage with citizens.
The city of Zwolle (Netherlands) operates a similar smart
grid/smart building project. Following a privacy engineer-
ing process [101], Zwolle implements data minimization by
performing most computations locally in-home, uses data
aggregated to residential area level, and separates knowledge
between the energy supplier (billing data) and the operator of
the distribution network (no link to personal data) [15].
The city of Bristol (UK) has enhanced 1,500 of its street
lamps with heat, sound, light, and air quality sensors. In
addition, the street lamps form a wireless mesh network that
is connected to the city’s fiber network [11]. The network
and sensors are not yet available for public use, but only as
an experimentation testbed for researchers and developers of
proprietary applications. Even though the network and sensors
are operating in the city’s public space, there is no information
regarding privacy, especially regarding what data might be
collected and stored from passersby.
G. Autonomous Systems
Autonomous systems, such as robots and drones, are still
in the early phases of adoption. To enable autonomous
operation, these systems rely on various sensors, which can give
manufacturers and operators of autonomous systems access to
sensitive data about the individuals the robot or drone comes
into contact with. For example, shipping companies are testing
autonomous drones for faster delivery. Domestic robots for
kitchen or cleaning tasks are already available on the market
and prototypes of robots for elderly care were presented not
only to engage in conversation [245] but also carry out nursing
care tasks [246]. Other robots include teaching robots [247]
which, when exploited, could generate accurate profiles of
citizens from an early age.
Data minimization. Outdoor autonomous systems usually
come with a variety of sensors to support maneuvering and
other tasks, and therefore the privacy challenges are similar to
those of sensor networks (see Section IV-D). The sensors of a
robot can gather much more data than needed for operation and
this collateral data could be exploited to learn about citizens.
For example, a robot emptying waste containers could analyze
the contents to learn information about the owner, and a delivery
drone using cameras for navigation could transmit photographs
of private property.
For indoor robots, the privacy challenges are similar to the
Internet of Things (see Section IV-F). These systems operate
in the most private place of citizens, that is, their home and
therefore have access to sensitive information. With more and
more human-like robots, people could also voluntarily disclose
private information as they might start perceiving the system
as a companion.
Privacy for mobility services. Autonomous vehicles are
envisioned to make public transport more efficient. The privacy
implications are similar to today’s account-bound taxi services,
where each trip is automatically stored by the provider. With
a high availability of autonomous taxis, people may choose
to give up owning a private vehicle and thus the taxi provider
could gain a much more complete view of people’s location
tracks. Anonymous usage of these services, i.e. anonymous
payment and authentication, can be realized with anonymous
or pseudonymous credentials (see Section III-B).
State of the Art Examples. Several locations in California
(USA) have deployed the crime-fighting robot Knightscope
K5, including shopping malls, the Microsoft campus [248],
and the Bakersfield Memorial Hospital [249]. The robot can
be rented via a machine-as-a-service model which includes
hardware, software, and data storage. Using a wide range of
sensors that include a 360° camera, infrared cameras, audio
sensors, thermal sensors, license plate recognition, ranging
(LIDAR), GPS, and proximity sensors, the robot autonomously
conducts surveillance in an area and sends the data back to
an operations center, gathering 90TB of data per year. While
Knightscope designed the robot to encrypt data communications
using WPA2 and SSL, the company claims that there is no
expectation of privacy in public places and thus the robot does
not implement any privacy features that would protect the
privacy of individuals in a meaningful way.
In Waseda (Japan), the humanoid robot Pepper is used to help
high school students study English [250], [251]. Despite its
humanoid appearance, Pepper is equipped with a wide range of
sensors and an Internet connection. Pepper uses online services
for speech recognition and a cloud solution allows to manage
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and remotely monitor the robot. Any interactions with school
children are thus at risk of being subject to remote surveillance,
which would allow profiling of children. Despite this risk,
information about privacy and privacy protections are not
available, neither from the school nor from the manufacturer.
H. Intelligent Vehicles
For traffic safety applications, vehicles periodically broadcast
their status (including their identity, position, heading, speed,
state of the turn signals, etc.) with a frequency of 1 to 10 Hz.
Other vehicles in the vicinity can then receive and react to
these broadcasts, e.g., by braking automatically or warning
the driver. Because these broadcasts are unencrypted, everyone
in transmission range can link vehicles to locations and track
their paths [88]. The same broadcasts can also be received by
infrastructure nodes such as traffic lights or traffic signs and
used for traffic efficiency applications.
Pseudonymity. The privacy protection suggested by the
upcoming IEEE and ETSI standards relies on vehicles using
a pool of short-term pseudonyms for ad-hoc communication
(see Section III-B). The level of privacy protection achievable
with this system depends on how vehicles change their
pseudonyms [160], however, concrete pseudonym changing
strategies are still missing in the standards [88]. Furthermore,
pseudonyms can be de-anonymized using meta data (e.g., home
and work addresses [252]), and the changing of pseudonyms
does not prevent tracking if the attacker is within transmission
range [222]. This can be addressed by making all vehicles
change their short-term identifiers simultaneously [221], which
maximizes privacy for vehicles not under attacker surveillance.
To avoid confusing nearby vehicles and thereby reducing safety,
pseudonym changes can be announced locally [222].
Knowledge Separation. The entity running the Certificate
Authority (CA) knows the mapping from short-term to long-
term identifier, which allows repurposing of transmitted mes-
sages to install automated traffic surveillance [88]. While
there are mechanisms that eliminate this mapping, e.g., blind
signatures [157] or pseudonym exchanging [221], they interfere
with the requirements for accountability and law enforcement
and are thus unlikely to be deployed [88]. In addition to
policies regulating when the CA is allowed to de-anonymize
pseudonyms, knowledge separation requires multiple institu-
tions to collude to achieve de-anonymization and thus prevents
misuse of the CA’s capabilities [207].
Backwards Privacy. To exclude a vehicle from the network,
all its identifiers need to be revoked. Publishing a list with
all pseudonyms would disclose the privacy of the vehicle in
retrospect [89]. Therefore, certificate revocation schemes that
are backwards-privacy preserving have been proposed to only
revoke future short-term identities of a car [89], [223].
Service and Device Integration. The integration of intelli-
gent vehicles into convenience applications, such as wireless
payments at gas stations or toll gates, can increase the number
of data holders and further complicate privacy issues. Toll
payments based on actual road usage can be performed in
a privacy-preserving way using local price calculation and
cryptographic commitments [150].
Already today, car manufacturers are collecting large
amounts of potentially sensitive driver information [253]. This
information may find its way to third-party apps through in-
vehicle app stores, either built-in or plugged into the vehicle’s
on-board diagnostic (OBD) port [254], and thus exacerbate
privacy issues known from smartphones [6]. Since there is large
interest in collecting user information – up to the point where
“there [could] come a time when more money is made from
the sale of private data as opposed to the initial car purchase”
[254], it is also the responsibility of the legislative authorities
to ensure against the risks of privacy violation.
State of the Art Examples. From 2018 on, all new vehicles
within the European Union are mandated to be equipped with
the cellular service based eCall emergency system [255]. The
eCall regulations mandate that vehicles are not traceable during
normal vehicle operation. To achieve this, the system only
connects to the mobile phone system when a serious accident
happens and stores previous vehicle locations only to determine
the direction of travel at the time of an accident [86]. However,
the eCall regulations only protect the basic eCall system, but do
not cover additional services. For example, insurance companies
may access the data to determine insurance premiums, and law
enforcement may remotely track individuals [256].
Drivers are often insufficiently informed about which data
is collected by their vehicle, and by whom it is accessed. A
recent example concerned a driver using BMW’s shared car
service DriveNow. After running over a cyclist, the driver was
convicted because the car had recorded information about the
car’s location and speed – despite DriveNow’s claims that it
doesn’t store such data [87]. While assisting the conviction
was certainly a noble cause, the system in general is privacy-
invasive and open to misuse, especially when customers are
misled into believing that the car does not store data.
In the context of cooperative transportation systems, Japan
has reserved the 760 MHz frequency for vehicular communi-
cations [257]. Several of Toyota’s production cars ship with a
cruise control system that uses vehicle-to-vehicle communica-
tion to maintain inter-vehicle distances, and with a collision
caution system that communicates with road-side units to avoid
turning collisions at intersections. In collaboration with the
Japanese government, Toyota has deployed 47 road-side units
in Tokyo, Nagoya City, and Toyota City [258]. Information
about the privacy implications of Toyota’s technology is not
readily available.
In the last years, autonomous driving has received attention
from car manufacturers (e.g., BMW, AUDI, Toyota) and IT
companies (Google, Apple) alike [259], and semi-autonomous
vehicles such as the Tesla Model S can already be bought today.
In 2016, autonomous taxis have been first introduced in Singa-
pore and are planned to be deployed in the thousands [259];
information on data protection and privacy was not available.
I. Cloud Computing
Cloud providers are used as part of public-private partner-
ships to outsource storage and/or processing of arbitrary smart
city data and services. This makes it necessary to consider
privacy in the context of cloud computing in addition to the
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City Technology Smart... Application Possible privacy issues Privacy measures Rating
Hong Kong Ubiquitous
Connectivity
Public
Services
Free WiFi access Browsing history and location
tracking
WPA2 encryption, user activity
is recorded and available to
authorities
G#
Hong Kong Ubiquitous
Connectivity
Public
Services
Companion app HK
GovWiFi
Profiling through phone
permissions: network access,
location, phone identity +
storage
No information about privacy
policy
#
Chicago Ubiquitous
Connectivity
Public
Services
Free WiFi access Browsing history and location
tracking
No encryption, no information
about privacy policy
#
Estonia Ubiquitous
Connectivity
Public
Services
Free WiFi access Browsing history and location
tracking
Mandatory data retention #
Hong Kong Smart Card Mobility Octopus card Data about public transport
usage and purchases
Data has been sold to
marketers in the past
#
Zaragoza Smart Card Mobility,
Citizens
Citizen card Linkability of individuals to
their card use
Privacy policy, but no
information about privacy
technologies
G#
Malaysia Smart Card Citizens Compulsory citizen card
MyKad
Card number leaks information
about user
No information about access
control
#
Almere Open Data Governance StraatKubus Presents sensitive data about
individuals
Privacy impact assessment and
access control
 
The Hague Open Data Environment City dashboard Data about emergency calls Reason for emergency call is
not included
#
Sydney Open Data Economy Tap-on tap-off data Data about public transport
usage
Differential privacy  
Chicago Open Data Health Aggregated health data on
city map
Sensitive health information
about individuals
k-anonymity  
Glasgow (Part.) Sensor
Networks
Mobility,
Gover-
nance
Operations center Combination and automated
analysis of CCTV footage
Compliance with UK data
protection law, no information
about privacy technologies
G#
Rio de Janeiro (Part.) Sensor
Networks
Environment,
Gover-
nance
Operations center Combination of CCTV footage No information about privacy
protection
#
Glasgow (Part.) Sensor
Networks
Public
Services
Intelligent street lights Location tracking Sensors detect presence, but
not individuals
 
Eindhoven (Part.) Sensor
Networks
Environment Stratumseind: people
counting and noise
monitoring
Location tracking, audio
surveillance
Local data processing, no
recording or transmission of
raw data
 
Oulu Wearable
Devices
Citizens App to track running data Location tracking Tracking only enabled during
runs
G#
Copenhagen Cloud
Computing
Mobility WiFi hotspots for traffic
flow and safety
Location tracking Information is aggregated and
anonymized, but no technical
information available
G#
Aspern Internet of
Things
Utilities,
Buildings
Smart grid Profiling via energy
consumption
User consent, user engagement G#
Zwolle Internet of
Things
Utilities,
Buildings
Smart grid Profiling via energy
consumption
Data minimization, aggregation,
and separation of knowledge
 
Bristol Internet of
Things
Economy Wireless mesh and
sensors on street lamps
Location tracking and audio
surveillance
No information available #
California Autonomous
Systems
Public
Services
Surveillance robot
Knightscope K5
Profiling, video and audio
surveillance
Wireless communications are
encrypted, otherwise no privacy
protection
#
Waseda, Japan Autonomous
Systems
Citizens Teaching robot Pepper Profiling of children No information available #
EU Intelligent
Vehicles
Mobility eCall automatic
emergency calls
Location tracking Basic eCall: tracking only
when accident detected.
Additional services: tracking
possible
G#
Japan Intelligent
Vehicles
Mobility Collaborative cruise
control, intersection
collision warning
Location tracking No information about privacy
protection
#
TABLE III
Examples of already deployed smart city applications with possible privacy issues and privacy countermeasures (rated as no/unknown #, some G#, and good  ).
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considerations for the underlying data or service. Securing data
in transit (see Section IV-A) is a necessary but not sufficient
measure. Privacy also needs to be protected while data is being
stored and/or processed at the cloud provider [260].
Privacy for Outsourced Storage. A straightforward solu-
tion to protect outsourced storage is to only store encrypted
data. However, even though the storage provider cannot see
the contents of the encrypted data, access patterns may leak
sensitive information. Private information retrieval protocols
allow to hide the access patterns to remote files [167] or
queries to remote databases [166]. Attribute-based encryption
(see Section III-B) is a one-to-many encryption method that
can be used, for example, to share personal health records. By
encrypting data not with a single key, but a set of attributes,
patients can exert fine-grained control over which groups of
people can access which parts of the health record [139], [140].
Privacy for Outsourced Processing. When users have to
authenticate at the cloud provider before data processing can
take place, attribute-based credentials allow authentication
without revealing the user’s identity, making sure that the
cloud provider cannot track the actions of individual users [19].
Secure multi-party computations are used when multiple parties
are interested in the results of a joint computation, but do not
want to reveal their private inputs [224]. Privacy-preserving
data mining allows to learn useful information from distributed
datasets, which can either be distributed vertically (entities
hold different attributes) or horizontally (entities hold data
about different users) [225]. Homomorphic encryption enables
computations over encrypted data [143].
State of the Art Examples. Copenhagen’s (Denmark) smart
city project, Copenhagen Connecting, operates a city-wide mesh
of WiFi hotspots that can locate and track mobile phones to
improve traffic flow and safety [22]. This project uses cloud
servies provided by a third-party company to store and process
data, and to provide a web frontend. The company operating
this service claims that the information is aggregated and
anonymized before being transmitted [91], but does not futher
substantiate the claim.
V. DISCUSSION
Our survey shows the complexity of privacy in the smart city
including a large number of challenges and possible solutions.
The sheer magnitude of systems and technologies make the
creation of a privacy-friendly smart city a gargantuan or even
seemingly impossible task. However, we believe that there are
guidelines and research directions which can be followed to
significantly increase the level of privacy in future smart cities.
This does not necessarily mean creating new privacy-enhancing
technologies but rather applying existing ones on a large scale,
effectively taking a more holistic approach. In this section, we
discuss challenges and point to promising research directions
that have not yet been widely considered in the context of
smart cities.
Optimizing the Privacy Design Process.When designing a
new smart city application, a standardized design process could
greatly assist in ensuring appropriate privacy protection. This
design process needs to integrate existing methods, e.g. privacy
requirements engineering and privacy testing (see Section III-A)
into a holistic process. In the software engineering world, many
design processes have been proposed, however, it is unclear
how privacy design should be integrated into these. There are
some proposals, e.g., the MITRE V-model [261] or a method
to incorporate privacy by design in agile environments [262],
however, more research is needed to find out which is the
best design process in which setting. Especially with regard
to the high level of interconnectivity and complexity in smart
cities, safeguarding single applications with a privacy design
process might not be sufficient. Instead there may be a need
for a general design process for smart cities that guides how to
make a city smart with the privacy requirements of its citizens
in mind.
Joint or Composable Privacy Technologies. It is evident
from our discussion in Section IV that due to the diversity
of smart city applications, different privacy technologies need
to be combined to achieve an acceptable level of privacy.
Indeed, smart cities combine so many technological components
that it is not enough to simply apply privacy technologies
to each component. Instead, we argue that the interactions
between technologies and data have to be considered to design
joint privacy technologies [205]. This is especially important
because many smart cities start with isolated solutions that get
integrated gradually. One method to facilitate joint privacy
protection is to focus on the interfaces between different
systems, on their level of interconnectivity and most importantly
on the data exchanged. For example, different components in
a sensing architecture could all (sequentially or in parallel)
deploy independent differential privacy mechanisms before
transmitting or publishing data [127].
Privacy Architecture Patterns. Architecture patterns de-
scribe a system’s components, their responsibilities, and the
relationships between them. (Design patterns are used to refine
the components and their relationships.) The lack of existing
privacy architecture patterns leads to the development of custom
architectures.
As described in Section III-A, we have found two groups of
privacy architectures in the literature. The first group contains
variations of a simple centralized architecture that does not
take into account the diversity of attackers and smart city
applications. Examples include proposals to safeguard all data
in a central repository either controlled by the government
[263] or a cloud provider [6], potentially mediated by a broker
[12]. The second group contains specialized architectures that
are tailored to specific application areas within the smart city,
for example smart health care [122].
The cost of making smart cities privacy-friendly could
be reduced if developers could apply an existing privacy
architecture, that is, they have guidelines, patterns, and tools
available to layout their system. This would include how
different systems should exchange data, where data is collected,
and what data is stored. Ideally, privacy architectures would
also encompass a modeling language to describe, layout, and
share different architectural approaches. This language should
include semantics to assign privacy risk levels to components
and data streams, and also describe properties of interaction
between components (e.g., encrypted or plain text). This
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helps understand information flow and identify possible risks
and points of attack, thus supporting the design of privacy-
preserving system layouts.
Incentives and Enforcement. Both joint privacy mecha-
nisms and privacy architectures aim to integrate isolated privacy
protection mechanisms into more general or even holistic
solutions. In smart cities, this integration is complicated not
only by a large number of subsystems, but also by a large num-
ber of stakeholders. To implement joint privacy mechanisms
in a coherent privacy architecture, various stakeholders will
have to work together on an operational level. However, this
collaboration can entail severe privacy risks because it may
enable stakeholders to combine data from several sources. To
mitigate these risks and realize the full potential of privacy-
friendly smart cities, cities need to set incentives that encourage
privacy-friendly collaboration and introduce ways to enforce
privacy-friendliness.
Game theory has already been applied successfully to privacy
problems, for example in vehicular networks and anonymous
communication, and has also been used to identify which
incentives can encourage desired behaviors (see [264] and the
references therein). We believe that game theoretic studies
will be an important tool to understand how privacy-friendly
behaviors can be encouraged in a time when privacy violation
constitutes a business case [5].
Blockchains are a promising technology that may be able
to enforce privacy properties. Blockchains are distributed
immutable ledgers that record and store transactions which
can be publicly verified. New transactions are bundled in
blocks and appended to the ledger (or mined) by solving
a cryptographic puzzle. Each new block is linked to its
predecessor (hence the name block chain). In blockchains,
users enjoy pseudonymity because they are only identified by
their public keys, and there is no need for a trusted third party
because a distributed consensus is achieved through the mining
of blocks. Originally introduced for financial transactions in
Bitcoin [265], researchers have started to apply blockchains
to non-financial problems. For example, there exist proposals
to use blockchains to improve security and privacy in the
Internet of Things [266] (see Section Section IV-F), and to
use blockchains as “decentralized personal data management
systems” that allow users to own and control their data [267].
We believe that more research is needed to explore whether
and how blockchains can be used for privacy enforcement in
smart city environments.
User-centric Privacy. It seems only logical to involve the
users more in the technology that is aimed to improve their
quality of life, but can also affect their privacy. Unfortunately,
the large number of services and citizens makes it infeasible to
manually consider user-centric privacy preferences – for both
the service provider and the citizen. Ideally, citizens would be
able to specify their privacy preferences and smart city services
would automatically adapt to the user preferences or warn the
user, if not possible. This would enable users to opt-out of
data storage, or even an entire service. This may require new
kinds of user interfaces that allow citizens to give meaningful
consent (see Section III-A).
Where possible, service quality should not depend on user
privacy settings to avoid punishing more private users. Many
solutions we have discussed in Section IV protect privacy while
fully preserving utility [96], for example aggregation in smart
metering using homomorphic encryption or secret sharing [79],
[153], [218], or device-local data processing for medical [78]
or people-counting applications [68].
Trade-off between Privacy and Utility. Privacy-enhancing
technologies are often not adopted because of a fear that they
will degrade data quality to a point where the quality of the
provided service is affected. Even though we have discussed
several utility-neutral privacy mechanisms, we believe that more
research is needed to show how privacy-enhancing technologies
affect the utility of smart city services.
This problem needs to be tackled from both sides: First,
operators, standards, and service providers should define more
specifically what data (and with which accuracy) is required for
the proper functioning of an application. Data overcollection
can only be stopped if it is clear what portion of data is essential
for an application, and what portion is not. For example, in
the context of communicating vehicles (see Section IV-H),
message formats for road hazard warnings as defined by the
ETSI ITS-G5 standards include sequence numbers which are
not required to warn other drivers, yet could be exploited to
track vehicles [88].
Second, privacy researchers and engineers should keep the
required level of utility in mind when developing privacy-
enhancing technologies to increase the likelihood of adoption.
To protect location privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks, for
example, several methods were proposed that heavily interfere
with the main goal of improving traffic safety, even though
adequate privacy protection can be achieved without affecting
traffic safety [222].
Privacy Awareness. Lastly, we believe that awareness for
the privacy risks that go along with the introduction of
many smart city applications and technologies needs to be
increased. People need to better understand that personal data
has a value attached to it and that it even can be seen as a
kind of currency [268], [269]. Increasing this awareness is a
challenging task, because it cannot be directly influenced by
researchers but lies in the hands of the media and political
powers. Unfortunately, it seems that only if there is a user-
driven demand for privacy, can protection mechanisms be an
integral part of the development and deployment process. Smart
cities need to embrace privacy-by-design principles from the
get go, because retrofitting privacy is bound to fail.
VI. CONCLUSION
Smart cities are complex. Various concepts, applications
and technologies interact to encompass every aspect of the
digital citizen’s life. Understanding this privacy-challenging
environment is the basic requirement for the development of
effective protection mechanisms. We analyzed smart cities
around the world and found that, with few exceptions, privacy
protection or even information on privacy policies is still scarce.
This survey contributes to improving this situation.
To break down the complexity of the smart city, we intro-
duced taxonomies for application areas, enabling technologies,
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potential attackers, data sources for attacks, and different
types of citizens’ privacy. These taxonomies allowed us to
present a holistic analysis of privacy threats and possible
solutions. We found many utility-neutral techniques, indicating
that the privacy-utility tradeoff may be less severe than usually
thought. We also observed that privacy solutions for different
technologies are often similar, indicating the possibility of
generic privacy patterns. These patterns along with a well-
defined privacy architecture can contribute to the integration
of the many tailored privacy solutions found in the literature.
In summary, we hope that our systematic review of privacy
in smart cities will support comprehensive privacy solutions
for smart cities.
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